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Abstract:
The importance of free speech is beyond dispute in liberal democ-
racy, and is today hardly challenged by anyone, but fundamental-
ist, religious groups. But which purpose should free speech serve, 
and how should it be (re)defined and administered in order to ful-
fill this purpose? I claim that these questions are more important 
than they may seem, and that they are easily overlooked, if free 
speech is treated as an end in itself or as something that one should 
not question at all. In the liberal tradition, freedom of expression 
was clearly valued for its excellent utility for the progress of society, 
but not for being an end in itself. In this article, I want, first, to make 
this point clear (through a reading of John Stuart Mill and Imma-
nuel Kant) and, second, to offer a couple of suggestions for relevant 
discussions on the restrictions, regulations and reinventions of free 
speech that might be required today in order to sustain and revive 
the liberal tradition itself. 
Keywords Freedom of expression, public use of reason, populism, 
Mill, Kant.
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Freedom of expression is one of the most sacred values of West-
ern democracies. It is universally defended, and often treated as a 
kind of crown jewel of democracy. And indeed, it is fundamentally 
important to democracy, but maybe we tend to forget that in the 
liberal tradition itself, which is invoked in the solemn declarations 
of the importance of the “value” of free speech, it is explicitly hailed 
for its utility, i.e. it is considered as a tool, a means, albeit a mas-
sively important one, and not an end itself. In the spirit of the en-
lightenment philosophers, freedom of expression is an idea that 
should therefore be developed, improved, and experimented with, 
much rather than “merely” defended, as if it was above historical 
change and political needs.
What I would like to do in this article is first to go back and in-
vestigate how two of the founding voices of the ideals of free 
speech in the European tradition, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill, viewed the relation between means and ends in the case of 
the freedom of expression, and thereby highlight the kinds of dis-
cussions, which I think need more attention in order to keep the 
concept of free speech alive. Secondly, and particularly elaborating 
further on Kant’s central notion of the public use of reason, I want 
to indicate a more specific reinvention, which I think is called for in 
the contemporary political climate, namely a way of revitalizing 
the idea of a public use of reason in an era where reason seems to 
have become almost completely “privatized” in the Kantian sense. 
The revitalization, I will claim, must come from new, collective 
forms of expression.
Means or end?
When freedom of expression is defended, one should bear in mind 
that this principle is an excellent means towards a just and prosper-
ous society, but not an end in itself. Or so at least thought John Stu-
art Mill, and before him Immanuel Kant. To Kant, as it is well 
known, the only real end in itself is the human being, and therefore 
any pragmatic or legal principle can only be enlisted as a means to 
serving this end. One could almost turn around the so-called “for-
mula of humanity” and claim that one should always, according to 
Kant, “act so, that you treat a legal principle only as a means and 
not as an end in itself”. Likewise, Mill, in his 1859 classic On Liberty, 
is completely clear and explicit that the freedom of expression is a 
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means for another end and open for revision. In fact, it must be, 
since the only real standard for the evaluation of ethical questions, 
according to Mill, is the contribution, which something makes to 
overall happiness, and therefore a principle however noble and 
valuable we might hold it, cannot be an end in and of itself (Mill 
1993, 79). The progress of humanity depends on sharing and criti-
cizing ideas, and Mill sees no reason except injury to limit the scope 
of what might therefore be uttered, but the principle still remains 
valuable entirely because of its utility, which consists in challenging 
the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” (ibid., 73) and 
the accompanying unhealthy and reactionary sense of infallibility 
(ibid., 85). 
My claim here is the slightly paradoxical one that lately it has 
been the doctrine of free speech itself that has become a passively 
received “hereditary creed” (ibid., 108). Doesn’t this description fit 
the way in which the notion, if not the reality, of free speech is most-
ly taken for granted, and thereby the “fatal tendency of mankind to 
leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful,” 
which according to Mill “is the cause of half their errors” (ibid., 111). 
A lot of debate is going on about, whether and in which ways the 
freedom of expression is under threat, (and how we can combat 
those that pose the threats), but not that much is going on in the 
field of developing the very concept of freedom of expression itself. If 
freedom of expression is a means, maybe even the essential means, 
for the progress of society, shouldn’t we consider it with the same 
scrutiny and openness that we consider any other means – from 
construction tools to tax regulation? John Stuart Mill, at least, em-
phasized that having a ready set of principles that are off bounds of 
discussion is only desirable to “the sort of persons who think that 
new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had 
enough of them now” (ibid., 96). 
What appears paradoxical in claiming that the principle of free 
speech has become a taboo relies precisely on the reduction of the 
principle to one fundamental proposition with only one possible 
interpretation. If freedom of expression only consisted in one sin-
gle, unequivocal dogma that “everything can be expressed without 
restriction”, the paradox could be formalized in the following way: 
A. Everything can be expressed without restriction. B. Principle A. 
may not be challenged. C. Everything cannot be expressed without 
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restriction. One arrives at this paradox only be maintaining the 
principle of free speech as such a simple principle without caveats 
or additional explanations. I claim that this is a misrepresentation of 
the idea of free speech, historically as well as normatively.
So, what is there to discuss? Firstly, I want to demonstrate that it 
is in fact almost inconceivable to imagine a completely unrestricted 
freedom of expression, and that the restrictions, we (must) have, are 
historically variable. This alone speaks in favor of an ongoing de-
bate about and elaboration of what we consider to be the right con-
cept of free speech. I will claim that there are always both juridical 
and moral considerations to be made, but also that it is in fact not 
even clear when we are free to say what we want to say in the first 
place. Secondly, this leads me to a discussion of Kant’s concept of a 
public use of reason, which I think is in need of new inspiration and 
experiments.   
Limits of free speech
Freedom of expression has always de facto been limited, even in the 
most modern, liberal democracies. Constitutions are usually sup-
plemented by penal regulations that specify how the limitations of 
free speech are (currently) being defined. This varies over time as 
well as geography, but restrictions regarding defamation, incite-
ment of violence, racism, blasphemy, etc. exist globally in various 
forms and degrees. Some restrictions are lifted, but others can be 
added due to new forms of communication technology, changing 
social norms or new forms of abuse – or combinations of these. In 
other words, it is in fact much more difficult to imagine free speech 
without any legal restrictions than it is to imagine one that is re-
stricted in various ways, and most legislators would probably con-
sider it to be completely irresponsible to lift restrictions without 
exception. To all, but a very few, it is not a question of whether free 
speech should be within certain boundaries, but which and where 
these should be. This obvious fact alone already establishes that the 
concept of free speech is historically variable and open to scrutiny 
and debate – or should be, on pain of being otherwise considered in 
a dogmatic, and, ironically enough, un-liberal, way.
The core principle of free speech is always limited by other legal 
considerations, and the reservoir for discussions and decisions on 
these considerations could be said to be the wider moral discus-
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sions in society about what should be accepted in which situations. 
In the case of blasphemy, for example, regardless of one’s position 
on the legal question concerning blasphemy, one might still find 
the moral discussion of it interesting and worthwhile. Even Im-
manuel Kant argues that there is something right about an image 
ban, because it creates the appropriate awe towards a highest prin-
ciple that cannot be spoken in words or drawn in lines – a divinity 
or a moral principle like the categorical imperative, which lies be-
yond customary views and legal norms (Kant 1987: 135 [AA 5: 
274]). Although this line of argumentation might not motivate one 
(it does not motivate me) to demand or want to maintain actual 
laws on blasphemy, the argument itself, I think, does make a lot of 
sense and does give reason to remind or even reconsider, what 
our laws are for, and whether or not there is a higher principle 
than that of legality. 
A second example is context, something which is relevant in both 
legal and moral discussions. Mill himself mentions the sentence 
“private property is robbery” as an example. When stated in a 
newspaper, this sentence should be completely legitimate, he be-
lieves, as part of the public discussion about economy, but it might 
be punishable in other circumstances, e.g. when shouted to an ex-
cited mob in front of a corn-dealer’s house (Mill 1993, 123). Or think 
of the derogatory names for certain groups of people. In some cases, 
they are relatively harmless; in others, they can support bigotry and 
hatred, and maybe even indirectly justify violence. This does not 
mean that certain words or signifiers must be banned from the lan-
guage, but that the use of certain words in certain contexts can be 
blamable, even punishable. (Just like screwdrivers should not be 
banned, but some uses of them most certainly should).
Thirdly, there are some more general philosophical questions 
that are less of immediate moral relevance, but nonetheless may 
throw some light on the issues involved in the very concept of free 
speech. In the Danish constitution, the section on the freedom of 
expression is formulated in the way that “everyone is entitled […] 
to make public his thoughts”. I think this is a wonderful formula-
tion, because it begs the question: What are then my own thoughts? 
Have I thought anything original or new that is really mine, or have 
I seriously considered some thoughts of others and made them mine 
through autonomous deliberation? Otherwise, what I say might 
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not really be my thoughts in any genuine sense. I think this is not at 
all as speculative, as it might immediately sound, because it con-
cerns the very ideal of the enlightenment, which was basically to 
share thoughts and improve them. When John Stuart Mill talks 
about the minority point of view, he always talks about the possible 
insight, truth or value, that is not (yet) accepted by the broader pub-
lic, but which might precisely contribute to the advancement of so-
ciety. The ultimate inhibition of the freedom of expression would be 
the situation, where no new thoughts were being produced. Fol-
lowing again a more pragmatic line in the interpretation of the prin-
ciple of free speech, the interesting question is not so much the 
stream of consciousness that is passing through my head, and 
whether or not I should be allowed to express all of it openly and 
immediately (again, I think that I should not), but rather the ques-
tion of how I actually may generate something that broadens the 
field of what it is possible to think. This might sound a bit solemn, 
but I think it nonetheless relates to important forms of threats to the 
freedom of expression other than the ones that one usually discuss-
es within the frame of the prohibition or legality of various opinions 
within a field of already established boundaries.
Express yourself!
So, what does it mean to express oneself freely; to express one’s 
own thoughts? Can this only be understood in terms of the absence 
of threats of violence or actual physical restrictions? Or can it be 
understood also in the way, that we, ourselves, don´t even have the 
means to express ourselves autonomously? That what we say, in 
many cases, is not our own thoughts in any important sense? The 
general thrust of Louis Althusser’s version of the critique of ideol-
ogy is precisely that we are always already embedded in ideology 
to an extent that it is not so much the active restriction of free speech 
that is the problem, but the normal, non-restricted reality itself 
which is unfree. Louis Althusser emphasizes how what one could 
call our spontaneous ideology comes from the interpellation of our 
surroundings. He called them “ideological state apparatuses” (Al-
thusser 2001), which means all the institutions that reinforce or re-
produce the hegemonic picture of the state and its inhabitants: from 
family and schools to police, government, and of course the media. 
We are constantly taught how to behave, what to believe – and even 
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how to see ourselves, which paradoxically includes an ideal of be-
ing autonomous, voluntary adherents of the ideology – consumers, 
for example, who “express ourselves” through our unique choices 
and purchases, etc., and thereby first of all confirm the ideology, 
which we inhabit.
We find another formulation of this problem already in Kant’s 
famous 1784 essay on enlightenment. The essay opens by defining 
enlightenment as “the human being’s emergence from his self-in-
curred immaturity” (Kant 1996, 17 [AA 8: 35]) – a slightly paradox-
ical formulation, for how can you release yourself from immaturi-
ty? Only by making a kind of modal shift in the way you make use 
of reason. In a way, we are all subjects of ideological state appara-
tuses in a very broad sense. Language itself is a gigantic machine 
for the reproduction of ideas, and it is in and through language 
that we express our thoughts – or that we have thoughts at all. We 
don´t invent our own language, but assume it, as we learn about the 
world. But the imperative of enlightenment is therefore not only a 
suggestion for spreading knowledge and education; it is not sim-
ply a question of knowing more; it is a practical demand addressed 
to every single individual: it is not what you know, but how you 
know it. Sapere aude! as it is called: Have the courage to make use of 
your own understanding (ibid.). This use is certainly not meant to 
be just any random use that expresses what pops into your mind. 
On the contrary: It means trying out one’s knowledge, question-
ing the received viewpoints, and reaching one’s own conclusions 
through the best possible examination. Kant has a particular name 
for this procedure: He calls it the public use of reason. It is this 
concept of a public use of reason that I will take as my focus for a 
discussion of where we might see the need for new inventions in 
the field of the freedom of expression, which have both political, 
moral and philosophical implications.
Public use of reason
Kant develops a distinction between private and public use of rea-
son, which to some seems counter intuitive, but which I think has a 
significant explanatory power. Reason is of course the very key con-
cept in Kant’s philosophy, and it was thoroughly analyzed in The 
Critique of Pure Reason from 1781. Three years later, however, Kant 
specifies how reason can be put to use in very different ways, and 
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he separates those in what he calls “private” and “public” uses of 
reason. The private use of reason is the one that one makes, when 
taking care of one’s own interests in the broadest sense, or even the 
interests of the public, but in ways that reaffirm one’s own standing 
in society. Reason in this way may separate humans from animals, 
but only in the sense that humans are more intelligent, understand 
complex situations and seek the most beneficial solutions. In other 
words: One makes use of the general capacity for reasoning and 
understanding the world in ways that correspond with the prevail-
ing order that one is part of. One obtains a salary, for example, for 
performing a certain function. When a policeman regulates traffic 
or carries out an interrogation, he is making private use of reason. 
Paradoxically, therefore, much of what takes place in the “public 
domain”, in the streets, in schools, in hospitals, on TV, are really 
forms of the private use of reason. 
By “public use of reason”, on the other hand, Kant understands 
the use, which a person may make as a learned person in front of 
“the entire public of the world of readers” (ibid., 18 (AA: 37)). The 
public use of reason is that which you might make at home, in your 
armchair, when you are writing a letter to the editor or a book or 
even a letter to a colleague or a friend, where you discuss certain 
matters. While this might seem secondary, it is in fact this ability 
that separates the human being, not only from animals, but even 
from itself in the sense of being able to rise above the immediacy of 
its surroundings and contemplate what would be more right. En-
lightenment depends completely on this second use of reason. Kant 
gives an example: If you are serving in the army, you are obliged 
to follow orders without debating their usefulness or legitimacy. 
However, as a citizen, the soldier might afterwards debate, whether 
the army is fulfilling its purpose or indeed whether having an army 
at all serves a legitimate purpose. Teaching philosophy is another 
example, (mine, not Kant’s), which I think highlights some of the 
issues concerning free speech today. Obviously, teaching philoso-
phy must be about teaching students how to think for themselves, 
what counts as a valid argument, where philosophy can provoke 
thinking or contribute to a better understanding of our predicament 
as human beings, etc. Nonetheless, fulfilling the function of a teach-
er clearly also shares many traits with the one of the soldier: You are 
in the service of the state, performing a specific function for which 
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you obtain a salary and certain benefits, like social standing, “cul-
tural capital”, etc. Performing your role, you have to abide by the 
exam regulation and take into due consideration the interests of 
your employer or funder, which more and more exclusively means 
focusing on the employability of the students, as it is so poetically 
called: The question is not, whether they will contribute to the ulti-
mate aims of humanity, but whether they will get a job, any job, and 
pay taxes. Maybe this increased focus on the outcome of teaching, 
how to promote the relevant competences for the job market, is con-
cretely changing the way, you teach students - or maybe you will 
insist that training their public use of reason is the best preparation 
for any occupation, they could get. But even so, it becomes more 
and more difficult to distinguish, whether, when teaching or testing 
students at exams, you are in fact making a public or a private use 
of reason. And what are they?
The pragmatic line in interpreting the principle of “making pub-
lic one’s own thoughts” relates to this question of a public use of 
reason. Performing well within already given frames and (implic-
itly or explicitly) confirming the overall picture of social norms, etc., 
would usually fall within the “private use of reason”, while the 
“public use of reason”, the capacity for critical and independent 
thinking, must rely on other spaces. One could talk about concerted 
efforts to promote the public use of reason in various kinds of teach-
ing, research, arts, media, etc., which have traditionally been sup-
ported by government funding with the explicit aim of furthering 
independent thought at “arms length” from the funders them-
selves. To promote public use of reason requires time and an envi-
ronment of experimentation and scrutiny that has come under se-
vere pressure within recent decades. What I call the privatization of 
reason is the general starvation of the public use of reason. We find 
it in universities, newspapers, public service media, political par-
ties, NGO/lobbyist work, advertising, etc. We find it in New Public 
Management, in the standardization and objectification of learning, 
in the austerity politics of the “Competition State” (cf. Cerny 1997; 
Pedersen 2011), etc, etc. Everywhere, compartmentalized experts 
and professionals are moving forward, and more and more, public 
use of reason is marginalized or made doubtful, as if the common 
belief in the very existence of a public use of reason has evaporated 
(“she is just saying X, because she really wants to promote Z”). 
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In Kantian terms, what we risk losing with the privatization of 
reason is the sense of the human being as part of what he calls a 
“kingdom of ends”, i.e. a realm of universal reason, where every-
one participates in virtue of their capacity as reasonable creatures 
alone. The ends that this kingdom serves are and can only be hu-
man beings, not doctrines or rules or nations. Not growth rates or 
employability. Making public use of reason thus entails not only 
that you distance yourself from your immediate interests and tasks 
in society, but also that you consider your fellow humans as some-
one who can appreciate an observation or an argument about a cer-
tain state of affairs. By making public use of reason, you treat your 
fellows as ends in themselves – as someone who can be addressed 
as rational creatures who are able autonomously to set their own 
ends and not only follow their immediate inclinations or orders, 
regardless of their interests, identities or mores. 
 The liberal principle of freedom of expression thus relies on the 
principle distinction between the universal subjectivity that can be 
ascribed to any individual, and the concrete, embodied existence of 
our cultural identity. Any human being contains both aspects – a 
universal and a particular, if you will. In other words, the liberal 
tradition distinguishes between an empty subject (the subject of 
enunciation) that upholds a right to express its thoughts and which 
can be addressed as such, and the concrete identities and interests, 
which one might simultaneously have (the subject of the enunciat-
ed). If one does not accept the “empty”, universal subject as a po-
litically relevant concept, one does not agree with the liberal idea of 
free speech. I think this is where the real division between the lib-
eral tradition and right wing populism can be found. When the lat-
ter proclaim the right to free speech, it is usually a strategic, rather 
than a principled stance. They will insist, for example, on the right 
to criticize Islam, use derogatory language about foreigners, etc., 
but not on the right to ridicule their own national or religious sym-
bols. Therefore, they are actually not for freedom of expression in 
Mill’s or Kant’s sense, because they do not agree philosophically 
with the idea of the universal human subject. The empty subject is 
a theoretical fiction in the eyes of right wing populism, because the 
human being is always embodied, placed in a culture, endowed 
with a particular set of traditions, values, etc. 
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Collectivization of the freedom of expression
The distinction between the subject of the enunciation (the “emp-
ty”, universal subject) and the subject of the enunciated (what we 
tell about ourselves, our values, etc.) is important to keep in mind, 
before I move to the concluding point. For I nonetheless think that 
a certain kind of populism is necessary to make it possible to enun-
ciate new kinds of political solutions and reinvigorate the concept 
of a public use of reason. 
Populism is the political movement that claims to speak on be-
half of the people (populus), and ideally that would imply a kind of 
enunciation that cannot so easily be reduced to “private interests”. 
When public debate has been so thoroughly privatized, as it has 
today, it may be time to experiment with the very idea of the public, 
i.e. to “open spaces”, if you will, where it is possible to speak again 
as a public and to a public – in the best interests of mankind in gen-
eral, as Kant and Mill would have put it. What is required is a new 
form of free speech that fosters genuinely new thoughts and ena-
bles a reinvigoration of the public use of reason. The right wing 
populist movements, however, do not contribute much to this am-
bition, as they are emphasizing certain forms of well-known con-
tent (what Jacques Rancière has called “archépolitics” (Rancière 
1999, 65)), much more than they are really contributing to political 
progress, neither on the formal level, nor on the level of contents.
Nonetheless, I think that some of the movements and parties that 
have emerged since the global financial crisis in 2008 have brought 
interesting new experiments in the struggle for raising voices that 
were very recently considered utopian, irresponsible or impossible, 
but nonetheless rely on strictly democratic ideals and methods. I 
think it is reasonable to suggest that what many of these move-
ments are trying to answer is the question: “How does one reinvent 
the public use of reason in an age of almost complete privatization 
of reason and of the so called “politics of necessity”? ”How does the 
public emancipate itself, when it has been almost completely dis-
empowered by the prevailing economic order?” As space does not 
allow me to go into any empirical detail and analyze e.g. Occupy 
Wall Street in the US, Podemos in Spain, or Syriza in Greece, I will 
instead attempt a more formal definition of my point, maybe just 
mentioning in passing that one of the characteristics of these move-
ments is precisely that they experiment with more democratic 
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forms of decision making, voting, institution building, etc. (See e.g. 
Zechner/Hansen, 2015).
In right wing populist movements, the people (in the sense of a 
general subject of enunciation with the right to decide for itself) is 
not enunciating a new content. Rather, an old content is identifying 
the subjects that are mobilized to repeat it as “the people”. The dif-
ference is, whether you move from a particular content, regarding 
for instance national identity, and “backwards” toward the position 
of enunciation, demanding that all speaking subjects must be 
shaped in “our” picture, or whether you move from the empty, uni-
versal subject to an experiment or an act that risks the articulation 
of what we could want to say. In the first case, collectivity is estab-
lished as a homogenizing effect of definitions and initiatives from a 
political elite; in the second, collectivity is an emergence of some-
thing new from a more or less spontaneous act of a group of other-
wise very different individuals. Maybe one could distinguish be-
tween collectivity through assimilation to a pre-established identity 
versus collectivity through a unification of the non-identical in a 
demand for new political ideas.  
In any case, the limit of populism, which must be kept firmly in 
mind, if one wants to stay within the broad frame of the tradition of 
the enlightenment, (and I think one should stay within the broad 
frame of the enlightenment), is the right to disagree with it, as well 
as the right to express this disagreement. 
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